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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BUD ALLEN, et. ai, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION, and 
QUESTAR GAS COMPANY, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 20060279 
(Consolidated with 
Case No. 20060280) 
Utah Public Service 
Commission Docket Nos. 
04-057-04, 04-057-09, 
04-057-11,04-057-13 
and 05-057-01 
Pursuant to Rules 24, 26, and 27 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 
Utah Committee of Consumer Services ("Committee"), a state agency advocating on 
behalf of residential and small commercial enterprise consumers regarding public utility 
matters coming before the Public Service Commission of Utah, submits its Responsive 
Brief in this case. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2-2(3)(e)(i) (2001). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Appellants have standing to appeal the Commission's order 
approving the settlement in this proceeding. This is an issue of law. 
Standard of Review: Correction of error, granting the agency no deference. 
Committee of Consumer Services v. Pub. Serv. Comm 'n, 75 P.3d 481 (Utah 2003). 
1 
2. Whether the August 2004 Commission Order denying Questar Gas 
Company ("Questar Gas" or "Utility") rate recovery of coal bed methane processing costs 
governs the outcome of the issues of prudence and rate recovery in this proceeding. This 
is an issue of law. 
Standard of Review: Correction of error, granting the agency no deference. 
Committee of Consumer Services v. Pub. Serv. Comm 'n, 75 P.3d 481 (Utah 2003). 
3. Whether the prudence of the February 1, 2005-forward coal bed methane 
processing costs Questar Gas Company has asked to be included in rates should be 
determined by considering the Utility's action and circumstances at the time it decided to 
incur those costs or its action and circumstances at the time the processing plant was built. 
This is an issue of law. 
Standard of Review: Correction of error, granting the agency no deference. 
Committee of Consumer Services v. Pub. Serv. Comm V?, 75 P.3d 481 (Utah 2003). 
4. Whether settlement by the parties of a long-standing and technically 
complex regulatory dispute in accordance with statutory law encouraging the settlement 
of disputes before the Commission should, absent extraordinary circumstances, be 
contestable on appeal by persons who chose to not participate in the dispute proceeding. 
This is an issue of abuse of discretion, 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Morton International Inc. v. Auditing 
Division, 814 P.2d 581, 587-91 (Utah 1991); Committee of Consumer Services v. Pub. 
2 
Serv. Comm 'n, 75 P.3d 481 (Utah 2003). 
5. Whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the 
Commission's determination that the coal bed methane processing costs at issue were 
prudently incurred and the resulting rates just and reasonable. This is an issue of abuse of 
discretion. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion and substantial evidence. US West 
Communications, Inc. v. Public Service Comm 'n, 901 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah 1995). 
Morton InVl v. Auditing Division, Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581, 586-87 
(Utah 1991). 
6. Whether due process requirements of sufficient notice and a fair hearing 
were complied with in this proceeding. This is an issue of law. 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Committee of Consumer Services v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm % 75 P.3d 481 (Utah 2003). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The statutory provisions that may determine the issues raised in this appeal are 
found in the Public Utility Statutes, Utah Code Title 54. They are the following: 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1 (2004) Utah Code Ann. §54-4-4 (West Supp. 
(2006) 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-1 (2004) Utah Code Ann. §54-4-26 (2004) 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-12 (2004) Utah Code Ann. §54-7-13 (2004) 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15 (2004) Utah Code Ann. §54-10-4 (2004) 
Other statutory provisions that may determine the issues raised in this appeal are: 
3 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-i9 (2004) Utah Code Ann, § 63-46b-13 (2004) 
Utah Code Ann, § 63-46b-14 (2004) Utah Code Ann, § 63-46b-16 (2004) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellants' Opening Brief presents an argumentative and inaccurate review of 
the factual and procedural background of this case. The Committee, therefore, rejects the 
Appellants' Statement of the Case and provides its own, 
/. Nature of the Case 
This appeal addresses the finality that should be accorded the settlement of a 
technically and historically complex regulatory dispute by agreement of the participating 
and informed parties. The settlement, and the Utah Public Service Commission's 
("Commission") order approving it, address Questar Gas Company's ("Questar Gas" or 
"Utility") duty to provide safe, efficient and reasonable natural gas service, and its 
corresponding entitlement to rate recovery of operating expenses reasonably incurred in 
the discharge of that duty. The Appellants' Opening Brief also asserts due process claims 
of lack of adequate notice and bias on the part of the Commission Chairman, 
2. Course of Proceedings 
The issue of Utility entitlement to rate recovery of coal bed methane gas ("coal bed 
methane," "coal seam gas" or "CBM") processing costs goes back to the early 1990s 
when new drilling and recovery technologies made commercial production of that gas 
possible. The Utility first sought rate recovery of its CBM processing costs in a 
November 25, 1998 application to the Commission, That application sought approval for 
4 
the Utility's contract with an affiliate for CBM processing services and for rate recovery 
of the resulting costs in a 191 Balancing Account cost pass-through proceeding. The 
Commission's December 3, 1999 order in that case (Docket No. 98-057-12) concluded 
that the Utility must seek rate recovery in either a general rate case or an abbreviated rate 
proceeding.l 
As a result of that Commission order, the Utility, on December 16, 1999, filed a 
general rate case (Docket No. 99-057-20) that included an application for rate recovery of 
its affiliate contract costs for CBM processing services. After approving inclusion of the 
record of the Docket No. 98-057-12 proceeding, the Commission's August 11, 2000 order 
approved a disputed settlement ("C02 Stipulation") that allowed partial rate recovery of 
the Utility's CBM gas processing costs despite a Commission finding that 
the record is insufficient to permit us to determine whether the 
Company's analysis of options. . . was sufficiently objective . 
. . [or] options were ruled in or out as a result of the influence 
of affiliate interests.2 
The Commission concluded: 
Clearly, QGC has the burden to demonstrate the decision to 
enter the contract is a prudent one. Parties differ as to 
lThe Utility appealed the Commission's decision to this Court, which set aside the 
Commission's determination and remanded the case back to the Commission for further 
action in accordance with this Court's ruling. Questar Gas v. Utah Public Service 
Comm 'n, 34 P.3d 218 (Utah 2001). The Court's remand was addressed in further 
proceedings before the Commission that culminated in its August 30, 2004 Order in a 
consolidated Commission docket. That Order is a central focus of the Appellants' case. 
Commission's August 11, 2000 Report and Order, Docket No. 99-057-20, p. 27. 
5 
whether it did so successfully. But whether or not QGC met 
this burden, we can and do conclude that its decision to 
procure gas processing has yielded the required result, that is 
it has effectively protected the safety of its customers. This 
means the costs of gas processing can be legitimately 
recovered in rates.3 
The Committee opposed the Utility-Division settlement and appealed the 
Commission's decision to this Court (Case No. 20000893-SC), which, in an August 1, 
2003 decision, rejected the contested settlement and the Commission's reliance on a 
"safety rationale" to award rate recovery. This Court concluded: 
If the record had permitted, the Commission could have 
carried out its initial obligation to review the prudence of the 
C02 plant contract and its terms, holding Questar Gas to its 
burden of establishing that the decision to enter into the 
contract and the cost it agreed to were prudent and not unduly 
influenced by its affiliate relationship with Questar Pipeline. 
Since the Commission found that no such record was or could 
be made available, it should have refused to grant a rate 
increase that included C02 plant costs. We therefore overturn 
the Commission's decision to accept the C02 Stipulation and 
to grant the rate increase proposed therein.4 
Upon remand, and after giving the parties a further opportunity to marshal the 
evidence in the record, the Commission, in an August 30, 2004 order in Docket Nos. 99-
057-20, et ai ("August 2004 Order"), concluded the Utility had failed to meet its burden 
of proof of showing its affiliate contract for CBM processing services was prudent and 
3Id. (emphasis added). 
'Consumer Services v. Public Service Com 'n, 2003 UT 29, 75 P.3d 481, 486 (Utah 
2003). 
rejected rate recovery of the June 1999 through May 2004 CBM processing costs at issue 
in the settlement stipulation. It stated: 
we conclude that Questar Gas has not met the burden of 
proving its actions constituted a prudent response to the 
introduction of lower Btu coal-seam gas into the Questar Gas 
distribution system. . . . We therefore reject the C02 
Stipulation and deny recovery of the processing costs during 
the period from June, 1999 to May 2004.5 
Commission's August 30, 2004 Order, p. 49. Contrary to the inferences and 
assertions in Appellants' Opening Brief, the August 2004 Order ultimately determined 
that the Utility failed to meet its burden of proof and not that the affiliate contract for 
CBM processing was imprudent. Commenting on the insufficiency of the record for 
purposes of making a prudence determination, the Commission noted at page 35 of that 
order: "[t]oo many questions remain unanswered," and at page 45: 
[o]n this record, we find that affiliate influence is clear. The 
degree to which it is 'inappropriate'. . . is unknown because 
explicit analyses by Questar management is (sic) absent. 
The Commission commented even earlier on the insufficiency of the record for purposes 
of determining prudence,(^^ "the record is insufficient" statement, page 5, supra), and it 
commented yet again in its January 6, 2006 Order in this proceeding, stating, on page 33: 
"[w]e were critical in our [August] 2004 Order of the lack of documentation in the 
Company's decision-making process in 1997 and 1998." But then, on pp. 37-38 of that 
order it stated (emphasis added): 
"The Company [as shown by the record in this proceeding] 
conducted a transparent decision-making process open to the 
public and subject to scrutiny by any interested person.. . . 
The Company identified the alternatives. . . , employed 
reasonable methods and criteria in evaluating the alternatives, 
and adequately recorded and documented its evaluation. The 
Company carefully considered potential conflicts between 
affiliates and placed the interests of its customers before those 
of its affiliates. This process satisfies the concerns outlined in 
our [August] 2004 Order, 
1 
Although it rejected rate recovery of the Utility's June 1999 through May 2004 
CBM processing costs, the Commission concluded its August 2004 Order with the notice 
that it would 
address, in a separate docket, how to craft a long-term 
solution to the compatibility of customer appliances with 
natural gas containing coal-seam gas consistent with the 
utility's obligation to provide safe commodity and service to 
its customers.6 
In accordance with that notice the Commission opened Docket No. 04-057-09 in 
September 2004 and chaired thereunder six formal technical conferences that were held 
from October 2004 through January 2005. 
Following this regulatory review of the CBM compatibility problem and its 
possible solutions, the Utility, on January 31, 2005, initiated this proceeding by filing an 
application with the Commission (Docket No. 05-057-01, et. al) asking for rate recovery 
of costs resulting from its decision to continue processing CBM by means of its existing 
affiliate contract for processing services. 
In April 2005, the Utility supplemented its application with written testimony and 
documentary evidence. That testimony and evidence included: (1) 32 pages of sworn 
testimony by Barrie L. McKay, with attached exhibits, Record 235, providing a 
background history of the CBM problem, a statement of the rate recovery result the 
Utility seeks in this proceeding, and the process it intends to follow for establishing its 
Commission's August 2004 Order at 50. 
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prudence and entitlement to rate recovery; (2) 70 pages of sworn testimony by Lawrence 
A. Conti, with numerous attached technical exhibits, Record 246, tracing the development 
of FERC interstate pipeline regulation and standards; reviewing the difficulties of 
providing interchangeable gas supplies to the northern and southern parts of the Utility's 
distribution system, reviewing the 1998 decision to lower the heat content range of the 
gas supply the Utility manages for customers, the temporary sufficiency of blending to 
solve the CBM gas problem, the possible alternative remedies to solve that problem, and 
why CBM gas processing is still the superior remedy; (3)31 pages of sworn testimony by 
Robert A. Lamarre, with accompanying exhibits, Record 279, tracing the development of 
CBM production in the United States, identifying the size of CBM reserves in the 
Rockies and elsewhere, and showing the value of CBM as a new gas supply resource and 
why the large growth in commercialization of that gas could not have been accurately 
predicted prior to 1998; (4) 30 pages of sworn testimony by Alan J. Walker, with 
accompanying exhibits, Record 283, showing the quantifiable benefits of CBM 
production for Utility customers; (5) 23 pages of sworn testimony of Robert O. Reid, 
PH.D.,with accompanying exhibits, Record 297, on further savings that accrue to Utility 
ratepayers because of the accessibility of CBM gas production; and (6) 23 pages of sworn 
testimony of Charles Benson, with accompanying exhibits, Record 304, showing CBM 
gas combustion tests and analyses. 
9 
After extensive discovery and analysis of the Utility's application by the 
Committee and Division and their retained expert consultants,7 the parties negotiated and 
concluded a comprehensive settlement that disposed of the outstanding issues and 
allowed the Utility to recover CBM gas processing costs incurred after January 31, 2005. 
The parties' settlement was regularly noticed-up on October 11, 2005 for an 
October 20, 2005 Commission hearing. At the hearing, witnesses for the parties testified 
regarding the development of the case, initial party positions and the basis for each 
party's settlement position. 
Mr. Dan Gimble, testified for the Committee. He summarized the report and 
conclusions of Committee expert consultant, Mr. Dwight Pfenning of Causey 
Engineering, Dallas, TX, that the presence of CBM in the Utility's distribution system did 
result in an increased safety risk due to increased carbon monoxide levels and flame roll-
out, for customers using gas furnaces and water heaters that had not been adjusted to bum 
a lower Btu gas stream.8 
Mr. Gimble distinguished the Committee's position in this proceeding from its 
position in earlier proceedings where it opposed any rate recovery of CBM processing 
Commission's January 6, 2006 Order, p. 36. The Committee retained expert 
consultants to review the Utility's Application after Mr. Ball's departure as Director of 
the Committee in March 2004. 
Reporter's October 20, 2005 Transcript of Proceedings, Docket Nos. 04-057-04; 
04-057-09; 04-057-11; 004-057-13 and 05-057-01, pp. 33-34, Record 2297. The 
Committee had maintained in earlier proceedings that the Utility had never clearly 
demonstrated that CBM was a safety threat to customers. 
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costs. He stated the Committee's cost causation argument in earlier proceedings 
"becomes less credible" as a result of the evidence in the record of this proceeding that 
shows the Utility is now purchasing "substantial volumes of coal seam gas supplies in 
recent years" - "25 to 40 percent of its overall market purchases." In past cases "Questar 
was purchasing minimal amounts of coal seam gas for its customers, I think less than 5 
percent," and the Committee was able to argue "the coal seam gas was contractually 
destined for other markets but was reaching the Wasatch Front via displacement and 
providing really no offsetting benefit to the C02 [processing] costs" the Utility was 
seeking to pass on to customers. Now, however, "[t]he simple fact is that Questar [Gas] 
has increasingly relied on coal-seam gas to meet its growing retail demand 
requirements."9 
Mr. Gimble then testified regarding a second reason for the Committee's change of 
position in this proceeding, that: 
the [Utility] has submitted compelling testimony in evidence 
showing that a combination of blending and diverting coal-
seam gas under [Questar Pipeline's] mainline 104 [pipeline] 
for delivery into Kern River system does not entirely 
eliminate the need to occasionally process coal-seam gas to 
protect the safety of Questar's customers. In recent years, 
either on-plant maintenance on ML 104 on [sic] [or] the 
favorable market prices on the Kern River system has resulted 
in significant volumes of coal-seam gas flowing to the Payson 
gate and on to Questar Gas's distribution system. Therefore, 
C02 processing is the most effective remedy available to 
9
 Id at 35-36. 
11 
address this situation." 
Regarding Committee concerns about affiliate conflict of interest, Mr. Gimble 
testified: 
The Committee continues to maintain that the management of 
an independent LDC [local gas distribution company or 
utility] would have contested any attempt by a pipeline 
company to pass along the gas management costs at issue in 
this docket. While customers [sic] [Questar Corporation] paid 
a very heavy price in non-recovery [of] C02 processing costs 
of about $40 million, it nevertheless generated a profitable 
business from transporting, gathering and storing coal-seam 
gas. 
The affiliate conflict issue led the Committee to conclude that 
Questar would have to give up all claims to recover past C02 
processing costs in any settlement package.11 
After considering the evidence in the record, the Commission approved the parties' 
settlement in a January 6, 2006 Commission order that concluded: 
Coal bed methane is now an important part of the gas supply 
purchased by Questar Gas for its customers. However, the 
use of this gas creates a significant safety risk for customers 
who have not adjusted their appliances to properly burn this 
gas. Providing a transition period for customers to have their 
appliances inspected and, if necessary, adjusted to the range 
now specified in Questar Gas's tariff is reasonable both 
because of the uncontested safety concerns and because 
customers need additional time to complete necessary 
inspections and adjustments. Given the extensive 
investigation and analysis undertaken by Questar Gas, the 
Division and the Committee to identify and compare 
{0Id at 36. 
"Id at 37. 
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alternatives for dealing with this risk, we find that operation 
of the C02 Removal Plant in accordance with the terms of the 
Stipulation provides a reasonable, reliable, cost-effective 
solution during the necessary transition period. 
Based on the findings of fact in the foregoing sections of this 
Order, we conclude that Questar Gas's use of the C02 
Removal Plant from and after February 1, 2005 to manage the 
heat content of its gas supplies is prudent and that the partial 
recovery of costs provided in the Stipulation is reasonable and 
in the public interest.12 
On November 4, 2005, after the Commission proceeding was over, but before 
issuance of the Commission's order, Appellants Ball and Geddes filed late public witness 
statements, Record 328 and 330, that alleged lack of proper notice regarding the October 
20, 2005 hearing to approve the settlement and Committee and Division failure to fulfill 
their statutory duties in agreeing to the settlement. Thirteen days later, Appellants Ball 
and Geddes petitioned to intervene in the concluded proceeding, Record 336, asserting 
lack of notice and that important affiliate interest and prudence issues addressed in earlier 
proceedings had not been properly considered by the settling parties. They requested that 
the Commission hold "a full evidentiary hearing."13 
The Commission denied the petition to intervene in an order issued the same day it 
issued its January 6, 2006 order approving the settlement, concluding the intervention 
^Commission's January 6, 2006 Order, p. 38. 
13Roger J. Ball and Claire Geddes Request to Intervene, Docket Nos. 04-057-04; 
04-057-09; 04-057-11; 04-057-13; and 05-057-01, pp. 11-12. Record, 336. 
13 
would materially impair the interests of justice and conduct of the adjudicative 
proceedings.14 
February 6, 2006, Appellants Ball and Geddes and 53 other persons who are the 
additional 53 Appellants in this appeal requested the Commission to reconsider its order 
approving the settlement,13 and Appellants Ball and Geddes' requested the Commission to 
reconsider its denial of their intervention petition.16 The Commission did not respond to 
either request, making its orders approving the settlement and denying intervention final. 
March 27, 2006, Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes and the 53 other Appellants filed 
separate petitions for appellate review of the Commission's order approving the 
Commission's January 6, 2006 Order on Request to Intervene. Docket Nos. 04-
057-04; 04-057-09; 040-057-11; 04-057-13 and 05-057-01. Record 1150. The Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann.§63-46b-9 (West 2004), requires that 
third party intervention be denied if the "interests of justice and the orderly and prompt 
conduct of the adjudicative proceedings will be materially impaired by allowing the 
intervention." 
15February 6, 2006 Request of Petitioners for Reconsideration of the Report and 
Order of the PSC, Issued January 6, 2006, Approving a Gas Management Cost 
Stipulation. Docket Nos. 04-057-04; 04-057-09; 04-057-11; 04-057-13 and 05-057-01. 
Record, 1156. Febmary 6, 2006 Request of Petitioners Roger Ball and Claire Geddes for 
Reconsideration of the Report and Order of the PSC, Issued 1/6/06, Approving a Gas 
Management Cost Stipulation. Docket Nos. 04-057-04; 04-057-09; 04-057-11; 04-057-
03 and 05-057-01. 
l6February 6, 2006 Request of Petitioners Roger Ball and Claire Geddes for 
Reconsideration of the Report and Order of the Utah PSC Issued January 6, 2006, 
Denying them Intervention, Docket Nos. 04-057-04; 04-057-09; 04-057-11; 04-057-13 
and 05-057-01. Record, 1159. 
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settlement. This Court, by its Order of June 5, 2006, consolidated the two petitions under 
Docket No. 20060279. 
3. Statement of Facts 
CBM natural gas 
CBM in recent years has become a vital natural gas resource for this country and 
the Rocky Mountain region in particular. According to the Utah Geological Survey: 
Over the past 10 years, gas recovered from deep coal beds has become a 
significant part of Utah's natural gas supply and reserves. The U.S. Energy 
Information Administration reports that in 2000 coal bed gas made up about 
35 percent of Utah's 4.5 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proven natural gas 
reserves. Thus, coal bed gas, once regarded as mainly a safety hazard for 
underground coal mines, has been transformed from a poorly understood 
resource to a major new source of natural gas in Utah, and elsewhere in the 
U.S.17 
Undisputed testimony in the record of this proceeding states: 
Natural gas from coals becomes more significant every day as 
demand for all types of energy increases. . . .CBM currently 
supplies approximately 10% of the gas used every day in the 
United States.18 
CBM gas has accounted for up to 40% of the Utility's annual purchased gas supply and 
saved Utility customers over $36 million in fuel costs alone in recent years.19 
17
 Survey Notes, Utah Geological Survey, Volume 34, Number 2, June 2002, p. 12. 
18Undisdputed April 15, 2005, Direct Testimony of Robert A. Lamarre, Docket 
Nos. 04-057-04; 04-057-09; 04-057-11; 04-057-13; and 05-057-01, p.15. Record 279. 
l9Undisputed April 15, 2005 Direct Testimony of Utility witness Alan J. 
Walker, Docket Nos. 04-057-04; 04-057-09; 04-057-11; 04-057-13 and 05-057-
01,p.20. Record 283. 
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Although the largest CBM production source nearest to the Utility's distribution 
system continues to be the Ferron fields near Price, Utah, new production fields are 
emerging in the Powder River Basin in northeastern Wyoming, and in the Washakie 
Basin in south-central Wyoming. CBM from these production fields is transported to 
market on the Kern River pipeline, which also delivers to Questar Gas.20 
While its value is now recognized, CBM was not always so well received. During 
most of the 1990s it was an unwanted nuisance in the Utility's distribution system 
because its lower Btu content would not safely and efficiently burn in customers' gas 
appliances that for decades had been set to burn the higher Btu-content gas streams that 
were then available and constituted the Utility's gas supply.21 Even when CBM 
production from the Price, Utah area began to substantially increase during the mid-
1990s, the future size and significance of that production was not predictable or 
appreciated until at least 1998, or later.22 
20Undisputed April 15, 2005 Direct Testimony of Utility witness Robert A. 
Lamarre, Docket Nos. 04-057-04; 04-057-09; 04-057-11; 04-057-13 and 05-057-01, pp. 
20-22. Record 279. 
21
 Alan K. Allred, a Utility witness in the initial 1998 proceedings for rate recovery 
of CBM gas processing costs (Docket No. 98-057-12), testified that the Utility's earlier 
Btu range for its gas supply had been established "for as far back as anybody working in 
the company can remember, or as far back as any records we could find." Rep. June 7, 
1999 Tr. of Proceedings. Docket 98-057-12, page 75. 
22Appellants allege on pages 67-68 of their Opening Brief that "as early as the mid-
1990s, [Questar Gas] knew about or should have anticipated" the growth of CBM into a 
major new source of gas supply. Expert testimony in the record of this proceeding, on the 
other hand, shows that Price-area CBM production is now "one of the 10 largest [natural 
16 
CBM began entering the Utility's distribution system in the early 1990s as a result 
of being transported to market in a Questar Pipeline Company pipeline that provided 
interstate transport of a major portion of the Utility's gas supply. The CBM entered the 
pipeline near Price, Utah, blending with the Utility's gas supply moving in that pipeline 
from entry points east of Price to a delivery point near Payson where it entered the 
Utility's distribution system. 
This natural blending of CBM with higher Btu gas in the interstate pipeline was 
sufficient to solve the problem of CBM incompatibility with Utility customers' gas 
appliances until the mid-1990s, when increasing volumes of CBM entering the pipeline 
began displacing, rather than blending with, the Utility's gas supply. In November 1998, 
after it was clear that blending was no longer a sufficient remedy, the Utility contracted 
with Questar Transportation Services Company ("Questar Transportation Services"), a 
Questar Pipeline subsidiary, for CBM processing services at a C02 removal plant Questar 
Transportation Services built and operates for that purpose, to remove sufficient inert 
C02 from the CBM to raise the gas' heat content to a sufficient level prior to it reaching 
the Utility's distribution system. 
gas] discoveries made in the United States in the past 15 years," and "no one realized the 
true significance of this discovery and its associated production volumes until 1998." See, 
generally, the April 15, 2005 Direct Testimony of Robert A. Lamarre, Docket Nos. 04-
057-04; 04-057-09; 04-057-11; 04-057-13 and 05-057-01, pp.26-30. Record 279. 
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The Utility Has Changed its Regulated Gas Heat Content Range 
CBM was not the only factor affecting the heat content of the Utility's gas supply. 
The Btu decline which CBM caused in gas flowing to the southern sector of the Utility's 
distribution system was often matched by a similar decline in gas flowing to the northern 
sector of the Utility's distribution system. There the cause was recurring commercial 
extraction by producers of higher Btu value gas constituents, such as ethane and propane, 
from natural gas sources available to serve the northern portion of the Utility's 
distribution system.23 
The Utility responded to these changes in its gas supply in early 1998 by 
petitioning for, and receiving, Commission approval to lower the heat content range of 
the natural gas it is obligated to provide customers to a level that better corresponded to 
the nature of the gas supply it believed would be available for distribution in the future.24 
23
 April 15, 2005 Direct Testimony of Utility witness Lawrence A. Conti, pp 26-28. 
Record 246. 
24The Commission's August 30, 2004 order summarized this change in the 
approved heat range for Questar Gas' gas supply as follows: 
Following a series of meetings and discussions beginning in 
January 1998 with the Commission, the Division of Public 
Utilities (Division), and the Committee of Consumer Services 
(Committee) to notify us of an imminent safety problem 
associated with heat-content levels in the natural gas supplies 
it was receiving from Questar Pipeline Company (Questar 
Pipeline), an affiliated company, and the incompatibility of 
that gas with current appliance set points, Questar Gas 
Company (Questar Gas or Company ) filed Advice Letter 98-
02 on April 21, 1998, reducing the heat-content operating 
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The Utility at that time informed gas appliance manufacturers and local dealers and 
plumbing and heating contractors of the need to adjust the customers' gas appliances they 
sold or serviced to safely and efficiently burn a lower heat content gas, and initiated a 
program to inform customers of the need to inspect and adjust their gas appliances as 
well.25 
range in its tariff from 1020 tol320 Btu per cubic foot (cf) to 
980 to 1170 Btu/cf. The Division filed a memorandum on 
April 30, 1998, supporting the change, and no party objected 
to it. The change became effective on May 1, 1998. [August 
30, 2004 Order, Docket Nos. 03-057-05; 01-057-14; 99-057-
20; and 98-057-12, p. 2]. 
25 y Appellants incorrectly state that the Utility's program to adjust customers' gas 
appliances "only recently has been launched." Appellants' Opening Brief at 17. In 
response to a Commission question during the 2000 hearing in Docket No. 99-057-20 
asking if the appliance adjustment program was underway, Utility witness, Alan Allred 
stated: 
It's been communicated to all dealers and installers, heating 
plumbing contractors. They are now, should be every time 
they service an appliance, every time they install a new 
appliance, it should be at that set point, just as under the old 
standard it should have been at the old one. 
In addition to that, as Questar Gas's service technicians are in 
homes doing adjustments and have time or as they get 
requests from customers, they are doing that work. But 
there's, you know, 100 or 50 of those people, and they have to 
do all the other service work, and there's 670,000 customers. 
So obviously they're not going to do all of the work in 10 
years. You know, a substantial amount of it's going to have to 
be done by heating and plumbing contractors as they do 
replacements or as they do adjustments. 
Reporters' June 23, 2000 Transcript of Proceedings, Docket No. 99-057-20, pp. 1008-
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In order to provide a safe and efficient gas supply to customers whose gas 
appliances had been adjusted to bum a lower Btu content gas as well as customers whose 
appliances had not yet adjusted, the Utility concluded it would process the CBM for a 
projected ten-year 'transition period' so customers would have sufficient time to have 
their appliances adjusted or replaced with new appliances adjusted by the manufacturer to 
properly bum a lower-Btu range gas. The processing would remove enough inert C02 to 
raise the energy content of the resulting CBM stream so it falls within the overlapping 
lower end of the Utility's earlier-approved heat content range and the higher end of the 
lower heat content range approved by the Commission in May 1998.26 
While the Utility's initial applications to the Commission for rate recovery of 
CBM processing costs were finally denied by the Commission's August 2004 Order [See 
Section 2, Course of Proceedings, above], that same order recognized the need for a 
"long-term solution to the compatibility of customer appliances with natural gas 
containing coal-seam gas consistent with the utility's obligation to provide safe 
1009. 
26In another critical error, Appellants assert that had the Utility initiated its 
program to adjust customers' gas appliances earlier, "it would have avoided imposing the 
double burden of this charge/?/^ the added expense of gas processing" thereby "sav[ing] 
ratepayers millions in processing costs." Appellants' Opening Brief at 27-28, 30, 34, 43. 
Undisputed testimony in the record of this proceeding makes clear that CBM gas 
processing would be required as a transitional remedy once the program of adjusting 
customers' gas appliances began - no matter when the program began. [Direct 
Testimony of Lawrence A. Conti, April 15, 2005, Docket Nos. 04-057-04; 045-057-4)9; 
04-057-11; 04-057-13; and 05-057-01, pp,. 36-37. Record 246. 
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commodity and service to its customers," and stated the Commission would open a 
docket to further address that need. 
In October 2004, the Commission accordingly initiated and chaired a series of six 
technical conferences for regulatory parties, the Utility, and other interested parties to 
better understand and craft a long-term solution to the Utility's CBM incompatibility 
problem. The final technical conference included an in-depth review of three preferred 
solutions for managing heat content: 
1. precision blending with CBM processing as emergency back-up; 
2. precision blending with Kern River pipeline gas as emergency back-up; and 
3. continued CBM processing with propane injection as emergency back-up.28 
After this regulatory process was concluded, the Utility decided to continue to manage 
the heat content of its gas supply by processing the CBM under its existing affiliate 
contract for processing services rather than resorting to some other remedy option. It 
applied for rate recovery of the resulting costs in this proceeding. 
In subsequent negotiations and settlement between the Utility and the other 
participating parties, the Utility waived any claim to rate recovery of CBM processing 
costs incurred prior to February 1, 2005 in exchange for rate recovery thereafter in 
accordance with the settlement terms. 
^Commission's August 2004 Order, p. 50. 
28The content of the six technical conferences is discussed in detail on pages 17-24 
of the Commission's January 6, 2006 Order. 
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S U M M A R Y O F A R G U M E N T 
The Parties to this proceeding reached a comprehensive settlement that fairly 
resolves a long-standing and technically complex dispute. Relevant and probative 
evidence in the record of this proceeding shows that the settlement is in the public 
interest; is in the interest of Utility ratepayers who are entitled to reasonable, safe and 
efficient natural gas service;29 and accords, in every respect, with Utah law that 
"encourage[s]" settlement by the parties of matters before the Commission."30 
The Appellants, none of whom chose to participate in the informing technical 
conference process or the eight-month Commission proceeding, seek to undo the outcome 
of that intensive process and restore the status quo ante for reasons that no longer pertain. 
Such a result would waste state and ratepayer money in a further dispute that litigation 
has shown itself ill-equipped to finally resolve. 
The Appellants' ill-conceived objective and arguments disregard the most 
important question in this proceeding: How do we best protect ratepayers' interests in the 
face of a changing regional and national natural gas supply? They never address the 
29Utah Code Ann. §54-3-1 states, in part: 
Every public utility shall furnish, provide and maintain such 
service, instrumentalities, equipment and facilities as will 
promote the safety, health, comfort and convenience of its 
patrons, employees and the public, and as will be in all 
respects adequate, efficient, just and reasonable. 
30Utah Code Ann. §54-7-1. 
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changes that have occurred, or are foreseen but have yet to occur, in the gas supply 
available to Utility customers.31 They never mention the 1998 Commission-approved 
decision to lower the Btu range of the gas supply the Utility manages for customers to 
accommodate those known or foreseeable changes. And they never offer any workable 
alternative to the Utility's decision to accommodate the transition to that lower-Btu range 
gas supply by continuing to process CBM 
The Appellants' implicit solution to the CBM incompatibility problem is for the 
Utility to further provide processing at no cost to ratepayers or to find some other remedy. 
The facts in the record of this proceeding show that neither option would lead to just and 
reasonable rates32 and both would encourage further litigation, since the Utility would be 
denied rate recovery of the remedy shown to be most efficacious and cost efficient in 
31
 The April 15, 2005 Direct Testimony of Utility witness, Lawrence A. Conti, in 
the record of this proceeding, pp. 33-36, Record 246, discusses these changes. The only 
mention Appellants make of these changes is a one-sentence argumentative comment on 
pages 50-51, and a further short paragraph comment on page 67 of their Opening Brief. 
32Regarding the meaning of the phrase "just and reasonable rates," this Court, in 
discussing an earlier reference to a "trust relationship"between a public utility and its 
customers, stated in Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. Pub. Serv. Comm 'n, 658 P.2d 601, 618 
(Utah 1983): 
That statement [about a trust relationship] . . . is simply an 
expression of the utility's legal responsibility to make "just 
and reasonable" charges for its services and to assure that 
those services are "in all respects adequate, efficient, just and 
reasonable." U.C.A., 1953, § 54-3-1. 
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managing the heat content of its gas supply through the transition period. 
The Appellants' legal arguments for undoing the parties' settlement in this case are 
as misplaced as their objective. The case law they cite to support their argument that the 
Commission's August 2004 Order is dispositive of the issues of prudence and rate 
recovery in this proceeding make clear that prior Commission Order has no relevance in 
this proceeding at all Moreover, the wording of the order limits its application to rate 
recovery of CBM processing costs for the time period of June 1999 through May 2004. 
The Appellants compound their legal error by misreading the wording of Utah 
Code §54-4-4(4)(a) that identifies the Utility "action" or decision the Commission must 
consider when determining the prudence of costs sought to be included in rates. That 
"action" is not the 1998 decision to build the C02 removal plant, as Appellants assert. 
That "action" is the Utility's decision to continue CBM processing by means of its 
affiliate service contract. 
The Appellants' claims, that they were denied an adequate opportunity to be heard 
and that Commission Chairman Campbell was biased and should have recused himself 
from this proceeding, have no merit. In denying Appellants Ball and Geddes untimely 
petition to intervene, the Commission effectively determined that Appellants' lack of 
participation in this proceeding stems not from a lack of proper notice but rather from 
their failure to become informed and to make their concerns known in a timely fashion. 
Regarding Chairman Campbell's alleged bias, they have effectively waived that claim by 
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not timely raising it - a claim they in any case have failed to establish. 
Finally, the Appellants have failed to demonstrate that they have standing to 
challenge the Commission's approval of the parties' settlement on appeal. There is 
presently pending before this Court motions to dismiss the Appellants' consolidated 
appeals for lack of standing or other authority, and those motions should be granted by 
this Court. 
A R G U M E N T 
L THE APPELLANTS SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED STANDING 
TO CHALLENGE THE SETTLEMENT THE PARTICIPATING 
AND INFORMED PARTIES REACHED IN THIS PROCEEDING-
The two principal Appellants in this case, Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes, petitioned to 
intervene in this proceeding after it was over, asserting lack of notice, that the Committee 
and the Division had failed to perform their "statutory duty," and that "the Commission 
has not heard from any party in this matter who had competently, effectively, thoroughly, 
professionally or vigorously represented the potential impact of [Questar Gas'] 
Application on its customers." They requested that the Commission grant them full 
discovery rights, the right to submit testimony and cross-examine witnesses, and that the 
Commission hold another "full evidentiary hearing."33 
The Commission denied Appellants Ball and Geddes intervention petition. It 
found they had "provid[ed] no explanation for not being aware of these proceedings" 
"November 17, 2005 Request to Intervene, Docket Nos. 04-057-04; 04-057-09; 
04-057-11; 04-057-13 and 05-057-01, at 9 and 10-12. Record 336. 
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despite "[a]ll requirements of the Open and Public Meetings Act [being] met," and further 
information about the proceeding being provided on the Commission's "publicly 
accessible website containing notices and orders"and which further "permits a person to 
request their inclusion on docket specific mailing lists."34 The Commission concluded: 
The Petitioners' ability or inability to participate in these 
dockets is of their own making. They give no creditable 
explanation for why they delayed seeking intervention until 
after the end of our proceedings, especially when they were 
aware of, or should have been aware of, Questar's request for 
recovery of C02 plant expenses. Questar's specific 
arguments and evidentiary basis upon which it sought 
recoveiy was available for months, without question 
beginning with the filing of the January 2005 Application and 
Questar's April 2005 testimony.3^ 
The Commission found Petitioners' claim that the Committee and the Division had 
not properly represented ratepayers and the public interest completely unsubstantiated: 
In summary, while Petitioner's legal interests may be affected 
by these proceedings (as indeed may the interests of the other 
hundreds of thousands of Questar customers), those interests 
have been vigorously protected by those statutorily charged 
with the task; namely the Committee, the Division and their 
respective experts.36 
^Commission's January 56, 2006 Order on Request to Intervene, Docket Nos. 04-
057-04; 04-057-09; 04-057-11; 04-057-13; and 05-057-01, at 6-7. Record 1150. 
^Commission's January 56, 2006 Order on Request to Intervene, at 13. 
36Id. at 14. 
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Referring to the requirements of Utah Code Ann §63-46-9, that permits interested 
third party intervention in an administrative adjudicatory proceeding where its is shown 
that: 
the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of 
the adjudicative proceedings will not be materially impaired 
by allowing the intervention,37 
the Commission concluded: 
[i]n view of the substantial efforts and expenditures of time 
and money incurred by all of the parties in this case, 
reopening this case at this late date to provide additional time 
permitting Petitioners to go on a fishing expedition.. .is 
contrary to public policy which encourages resolution by 
negotiated stipulation... .There has been extensive 
investigation of why it may be or why it may not be 
appropriate and prudent to utilize the C02 plant for 
circumstances as they now are or are expected to be for 
Questar and its customers. . . . Appropriate notices for all of 
the Commission's technical conferences and docket 
proceedings have been given; the Commission has complied 
with the requirements of Utah law. . . . The Commission has 
conducted an evidentiary hearing to receive evidence to 
resolve the matter. Other public witnesses were aware of that 
hearing's scheduling and the time set for it; they appeared and 
provided their statements to the Commission. Petitioners 
have been provided the opportunity to submit written 
statements, they have submitted them and they have been 
considered by the Commission.... We are unpersuaded by 
Petitioners' arguments that their intervention at this stage is 
necessary, can be done without violating Utah Code §63-46b-
9fs touchstones regarding impairment of the interests of 
justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of proceedings, 
nor without setting a debilitating intervention precedent... 
Wherefore, it is hereby ORDERED that Roger Ball's and 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-9(2)(b) (2001). 
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Clair Geddess' Petition to Intervene is denied.38 
If Ball's and Geddes' participation was untimely and impairing of the interests of 
justice prior to appeal, neither they nor the other 53 Appellants have provided any new 
evidence or compelling reason that would allow one to conclude that Appellants' 
participation at this even later stage in the proceeding would be any more salutary, any 
less impairing of the interests of justice, or any less of a "debilitating... precedent."39 
There is pending before this Court a May 2, 2006 Motion to Dismiss that was filed 
by the Utility in response to the Appellants' March 27, 2006 Petition for Review. In a 
June 5, 2006 Order, this Court deferred ruling on that motion, stating it would consider 
the matter upon full briefing and oral argument. The Committee supports and adopts the 
argument and conclusions in the Utility's pending motion and urges the Court to grant the 
motion and dismiss this appeal. 
II. NEITHER THE COMMISSION'S AUGUST 2004 ORDER 
NOR THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ORDER 
IS BASED ON GOVERN THE DETERMINATION OF 
PRUDENCE OR RATE RECOVERY IN THIS PROCEEDING. 
The lack of merit in Appellants' appeal does not rest solely with their failure to 
timely participate in the Commission proceeding or their lack of standing to appeal the 
outcome of that proceeding to this Court. Even if they had participated in the proceeding 
and even if they had standing to appeal, the arguments in their Opening Brief for why this 
"Id at 14-15. 
'
9Id at 15. 
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Court should undo the settlement the parties reached in this case are legally flawed and 
without merit. 
A. The Wording and Intent of the Commission Js August 2004 Order 
Limits its Application to the CBM Processing Costs at Issue in that Case. 
Much of the Appellants' argument in this appeal is based on a lack of 
understanding of the record and Commission findings in earlier proceedings. For 
example, their Opening Brief asserts that the Commission's August 2004 Order resolves 
the issue of rate recovery of CBM processing expenses in this proceeding, yet the order's 
wording limits its application to the record facts and costs at issue in that case: 
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Questar Gas 
has not met the burden of proving its actions constituted a 
prudent response to the introduction of lower Btu coal-seam 
gas into the Questar Gas distribution system.. .We therefore 
reject the C02 Stipulation and deny recovery of the 
processing costs during the period from June 1999 to May 
2004.40 
The Commission further emphasizes the order's limited applicability in a response it 
made to a Utility request for clarification of that very point: 
The [August 2004 Order] addressed only Questar's failure to 
substantiate approval of the C02 Stipulation in these 
proceedings and our necessary rejection of the Stipulation, 
which would have permitted recovery of some processing 
costs through May of 2004. Our reference to the May 2004 
end date was dictated by the Stipulation's terms and was not 
intended to have any other preclusive effect on recovery by 
Questar. In regards to Questar's request for clarification and 
reconsideration, we state that our Order does not preclude 
'Commission's August 2004 Order, p. 49. 
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Questar from seeking recovery of C02 processing costs in 
other dockets A{ 
The factual and time limitations to the Commission's August 2004 Order are not 
surprising. It draws upon a factual record that had already been closed four years earlier, 
and by the time it was issued the circumstances regarding CBM's presence in the utilities 
distribution system were changing. 
The Commission calls attention to these changes and their import in its 
unambiguous notice at the end of the August 2004 Order. After stating it would 
determine the disposition of monies already collected in rates for CBM processing during 
June 1999 through May 2004 in a separate proceeding, the Commission concluded: 
We will also address, in a separate docket, how to craft a 
long-term solution to the compatibility of customer appliances 
with natural gas containing coal-seam gas consistent with the 
utility's obligation to provide safe commodity and service to 
its customers.42 
^Commission's October 20, 2004 Order on Request for Reconsideration and 
Clarification, Docket Nos. 98-057-12; 99-057-20, 01-057-14 and 03-057-05, p. 4 
(emphasis added). On page 48 of their Opening Brief, Appellants attempt to minimize 
the Commission's clarification by arguing the Commission simply "declined to pre-judge 
issues or to give an advisory opinion of matters not before it." Nevertheless, had the 
Commission intended that its order be binding in other proceedings, its clarification, that 
the order "was not intended to have any other preclusive effect on recovery by Questar," 
is obviously inaccurate and misleading. A much more reasonable interpretation of the 
clarification is the Order was intended to only apply to the facts and costs at issue in that 
proceeding. 
42Commission's August 2004 Order, p. 50. 
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The proceedings referred to in this notice were the six technical conferences the 
Commission chaired that, in turn, led to this proceeding. 
Putting Appellants' res judicata claims aside for the moment, a simple reading of 
the August 2004 Order demonstrates the error in their argument. The August 2004 Order 
does not govern in this proceeding because it was never intended to govern, and its 
wording so states. 
B. The Commission Js August 2004 Order Has no 
Res Judicata or Precedential Application in this Case. 
Even if the wording of the Commission's August 2004 Order did not preclude its 
application in this instance, the case law the Appellants cite to support their res judicata 
argument clearly does. That case law distinguishes rate case proceedings such as this one 
from the usual application of that doctrine of repose and further states that differing 
factual circumstances, such as those that distinguish this proceeding, preclude the 
application of the August 2004 Order to the rate recovery issues in this case. 
The Commission's January 6, 2006 Order properly recognized the changed 
circumstances in the record of this proceeding and concluded: 
In considering the prudence of Questar Gas's decision to use 
the C02 Removal Plant to manage the heat content of its gas 
supplies since February 1, 2005, we must consider the facts 
and conditions as they existed at that time. Our prior finding 
that the Company failed to demonstrate prudence in its 
decision to contract for construction and operation of the C02 
Removal Plant during the 1997 and 1998 time frame is 
relevant only to the extent the same conditions present in 
1997 and 1998 continue to be present Based on the evidence 
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presented in these dockets, it is apparent these conditions 
have changed [emphasis added].43 
The Commission goes on to recount how the record circumstances in this case markedly 
differ from those in the record of the earlier proceedings: (1) There was a "lack of 
documentation" of the Utility's decision-making process in the earlier proceedings;44 
however, in this case the Utility "conducted a transparent decision-making process" that 
"employed reasonable methods and criteria in evaluating alternatives, and adequately 
recorded and documented its evaluation" and "carefully considered potential conflicts 
between affiliates and placed the interests of its customers before those of its affiliates."45 
(2) In the earlier proceedings the Commission determined the presence of CBM gas 
"could have been the result of Questar Pipeline taking advantage of a business 
opportunity to transport that gas," and the Utility "analysis of possible solutions appeared 
to be influenced by affiliate considerations;"46 however, in this case Utility "customers 
have benefitted from the shipment of coal bed methane by Questar Pipeline," and "[t]he 
amount of coal bed methane on the interstate pipeline system is increasing and represents 
an increasingly important source of gas to meet growing customer demands as traditional 
^Commission's January 6, 2006 Order, p. 33 (emphasis added). 
44Id at 33. 
45Id. at 37. Record Documents 104 through 213 illustrate the "transparent" process 
the Commission refers to. 
46Id at 33. 
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gas supplies decline."47 (3) In the earlier proceeding the Commission was "troubled by 
the fact that the contract for operation of the C02 Removal Plant was given to an 
unregulated affiliate of Questar Gas;48 however, in this case 
the record also establishes that having the C02 Removal Plant 
owned and operated by Questar Transportation does not result 
in any prejudice to Questar Gas or its customers [since] the 
costs incurred by Questar Gas are the same as if the plant 
were owned and operated by Questar Gas.49 
(4) In the earlier proceeding the Commission concluded the Utility "should have 
anticipated the safety issue earlier than it did, which may have allowed more time to 
"address the issue and pursue other alternatives, such as . . . action by Questar Gas at the 
FERC;"50 however, in this case 
[n]o Party believes it would be reasonable to pursue actions at 
the FERC to attempt to keep coal bed methane off of Questar 
Pipeline. Indeed, it appears that pursuing such actions would 
be detrimental to Questar Gas customers. Therefore, the fact 
that Questar Gas did not pursue these potential actions prior to 
47Id. at 34. See, April 15, 2005 Direct Testimony of Robert A. Lamarre, Record 
279, at 12-28, on CBM as a vital gas supply resource; and April 15 Direct Testimony of 
Alan J. Walker, Record 283, at 4 and 10-23, on financial savings that have accrued to 
Utility ratepayers as a result of the availability of CBM. 
48/</. at33. 
49Id at 34. See, April 15, 2005 Direct Testimony of Barrie L. McKay, Record 234, 
at 27-28, stating, in part: "a prudent utility would attempt to negotiate a contract with its 
affiliate that costs no more than it could provide the service itself. Questar Gas has done 
so. Given this, it would be of no benefit for Questar Gas to pursue ownership of the 
plant." 
5 0Mat33. 
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1999, which gave rise to concerns about affiliate conflicts in 
prior proceedings, does not give rise to the same concerns in 
the current contextsl 
The Appellants rely on the Utah case of Salt Lake Citizens v. Mountain States 
Telephone, 846 P.2d 1245, 1252-53 (Utah 1992) for their res judicata argument, but that 
case actually supports the Commission's conclusion that its August 2004 Order does not 
govern the issues of prudence and rate recovery in this case. This Court observed in Salt 
Lake Citizens that res judicata 
has only limited applicability to agency proceedings, such as 
rate cases where the predominant issue is what constitutes a 
just and reasonable rate for a future period. What constitutes a 
just and reasonable rate of return, the cost of capital, and the 
various expenses and revenue amounts cannot be decided on 
the basis of a prior rate proceeding but must be determined 
anew in each rate case.^2 
This Court then identifies the circumstances where res judicata may apply, which only 
further demonstrates the inapplicability of that legal doctrine in this instance: 
Res judicata applies when there has been a prior adjudication 
of a factual issue and an application of a rule of law to those 
facts. In other words, res judicata bars a second adjudication 
of the same facts under the same rule of law. ^ 3 
5{Id. at 35. See, April 15, 2005 Direct Testimony of Alan J. Walker, Record 283, at 
24-25, stating, in part, that "any effort to keep CBM off of Questar Pipeline would have 
been ill-advised because it would have resulted in proceedings at FERC where other 
shippers would have attempted to keep [Utility]-owned gas off of Questar Pipeline unless 
it was processed to remove hydrocarbon liquids." 
52Salt Lake Citizens, 846 P.2d at 1251 (citation omitted). 
53Id at 1251-52. 
34 
Were this proceeding about the prudence and rate recovery of the Utility's June 
1999 through May 2004 CBM gas processing costs that were at issue in the August 2004 
Order, the Appellants' claim ofres judicata would be relevant. Since, however, this 
proceeding is about different costs, incurred as a result of a different decision and under 
different circumstances, Salt Lake Citizens makes clear the Commission's August 2004 
Order has no res judicata application to the present controversy at all. 
Salt Lake Citizens further shows that the Commission's August 2004 Order is also 
not controlling of the issues of prudence and rate recovery in this case under established 
rules of case precedent. Noting that case precedent or stare decisis also "has limited 
applicability to administrative agency cases,"54 this Court states that u[r]ules of law 
developed in the context of adjudication are as binding as those promulgated by agency 
rule making," but 
[tjhat does not mean, however, that a rule of law established 
in adjudication can never be changed by the agency that 
established it. Administrative agencies must, and do, have the 
power to overrule a prior decision when there is a reasonable 
basis for doing so. As this Court stated in Reaveley v. Public 
Service Commission, 20 Utah 2d 237, 242, 436 P.2d 797, 800 
(1968), "Certainly an administrative agency which has a duty 
to protect the public interest ought not be precluded from 
improving its collective mind should it find that a prior 
decision is not now in accordance with its present idea of 
what the public interest requires."55 
[Id at 1252. 
'Id. at 1253 (emphasis added). 
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In other words, even //the Commission's August 2004 Order indicated it was 
applicable to other proceedings (which, as discussed above, it does not), the Commission 
has the power to overrule that order "where there is a reasonable basis for doing so."^6 
The Commission's January 6, 2006 Order detailed the substantial factual changes that 
have occurred since its August 2004 Order and why those changed circumstances make 
the August 2004 Order no longer applicable to the issues in this case. As this Court in the 
instant case explains, those enumerated changed conditions would also constitute a 
reasonable basis for "overruling" the application of its August 2004 Order were there any 
reason to conclude that order was intended to govern this rate proceedings. Either way, it 
should be clear that the August 2004 Order is not determinative of the issues of prudence 
or rate recovery in this case. 
In summary, the Commission's August 2004 Order does not determine the 
outcome of the issues of prudence and rate recovery in this proceeding either under the 
doctrine of res judicata or under case precedential rules. 
C. The Commission Properly Judged the Prudence of the Costs 
at Issue in this Proceeding by Considering the Utility Action 
that Led to those Costs in Light of the Circumstances that 
Existed at the Time the Action was Taken. 
The Appellants argue that even if their res judicata argument is not valid the 
prudence of the CBM processing costs at issue in this proceeding must nevertheless be 
56Utah Code Ann. §54-7-13 gives the Commission the express power to: "at any 
time, upon notice to the public utility affected and after opportunity to be heard, rescind, 
alter, or amend any order or decision made by it." 
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determined by reference to the circumstances in the record that the Commission's August 
2004 Order is based on. 
Their argument raises the logical quandary of how the law could require 
application of past differing facts to a subsequent case when the doctrine of res judicata 
makes those past differing facts and the decision based on those facts inapplicable. The 
law resolves the quandary by affirming the correctness of the Commission's prudence 
determination. 
The procedure the Commission is to follow in making a prudence determination, 
and the circumstances it is to consider, are codified in the Utah law the Appellants cite 
but misapply. Utah Code Ann. §54-4-4(4)(a) (2001) provides: 
If, in the commission's determination of just, reasonable, or 
sufficient rates, the commission considers the prudence of an 
action taken by a public utility, or an expense incurred by a 
public utility, the commission shall apply the following 
standards in making its prudence determination: 
(i) ensure just and reasonable rates for the retail 
ratepayers of the public utility in this state; 
(ii) focus on the reasonableness of the expense 
resulting from the action of the public utility judged as 
of the time the action was taken; 
(iii) determine whether a reasonable utility, knowing 
what the utility knew or reasonably should have 
known, at the time of the action, would reasonably 
have incurred all or some portion of the expense, in 
taking the same or some other prudent action; and 
(iv) apply other factors determined by the commission 
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to be relevant, consistent with the standards specified 
in this section. 
The Appellants argue this statutory wording requires that the Commission 
determine the prudence of the CBM processing costs at issue by considering the 
circumstances back in 1998, or earlier, when the C02 removal plant was constructed. For 
them, the prudence issue is whether the decision to build the processing plant and its 
ensuing cost were reasonable.57 
The problem with the Appellants' argument is the Utility is not asking for rate 
recovery of the costs to construct the C02 removal plant, and never has. It does not even 
own the plant: Questar Transportation Services owns and operates the plant. If the utility 
owned it, it would not merely be seeking recovery of plant processing costs; it would be 
seeking approval to include the capital cost of the plant in rate base upon which it would 
then be entitled to earn a return on investment. 
If the Commission, as per the statutory wording, is to "focus on the reasonableness 
of the expense resulting from the action of the public utility," the expense must be the 
57The Appellants' Opening Brief states on page 54: "Questar Gas had a full and 
fair opportunity to show prudence in connection with the Plant construction in hearings 
before the Commission from 1998 to 2004." On page 60 it states: "Questar Gas and the 
Division (now joined by the Committee) again seek recovery of a portion of the costs 
associated with the C02 Plant."On page 63 it states: "The Commission's faulty 
justification for endorsing gas processing costs for the period after January 31, 2005 -
even though the Plant construction in 1998 which gave rise to these costs was deemed 
imprudent and even illegal by a formal adjudication in August of 2004 - is illustrated by 
the following hypothetical.. ." On page 66 it states: [tjhe decision under review in this 
case was Questar's determination to build the Plant in its affiliate, Questar 
Transportation." 
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CBM processing services expense. And, since the only CBM processing services 
expense under consideration for rate recovery in this proceeding is CBM processing 
services expense incurred on or after February 1, 2005,58 the essential task becomes one 
of identifying the Utility "action" that uresult[ed]" in that particular "expense." 
This is precisely the task the Commission went through in its prudence evaluation. 
It stated in its January 6, 2006 Order: 
We need not assess the prudence of the Company's actions 
prior to February I, 2005 since, pursuant to the Stipulation, 
the Company has agreed to forego request of any cost 
recovery prior to this date?9 
It then identified the Utility decision-making process that resulted in the post-January 31, 
58Paragraph 9 of the settlement provides: 
The Parties agree that Questar Gas should be granted cost 
recovery as provided below: 
(a) Past Costs. If this Stipulation is approved in a final 
order and Questar Gas actually receives the recovery 
contemplated in paragraph 9(c), Questar Gas will not 
seek recovery of approximately $15 million of past gas 
management costs incurred from January 1, 2003 
through January 31, 2005. 
(b) Cost Recovery beginning February L 2005. Rate 
recovery shall be allowed for costs incurred after 
January 31, 2005, pursuant to the terms of this 
Stipulation.. . . 
October 7, 2005 Gas Management Cost Stipulation, docket Nos. 04-057-04; 
04-057-09; 04-07-11; 04-057-13 and 05-057-01, Record 322. 
^Commission's January 6, 2005 Order, p. 28, Footnote 13. 
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2005 CBM processing expense in the following finding: 
The Company conducted a transparent decision-making 
process open to the public and subject to scrutiny by any 
interested person. Throughout the technical conference 
process, Questar Gas repeatedly sought input from other 
parties on how to best address the issues presented by the 
presence of coal bed methane going forward. No participant 
challenged the conclusions Questar Gas presented as being 
prudent and in the best interests of customers, and no 
participant suggested any alternative as more preferable. 
Questar Gas clearly identified its objective to address the 
safety issue posed by the presence of coal bed methane on its 
system. The Company identified alternatives to meet this 
objective, employed reasonable methods and criteria in 
evaluating the alternatives, and adequately recorded and 
documented its evaluation. The company carefully 
considered potential conflicts between affiliates and placed 
the interests of its customers before those of its affiliates. 
This process satisfies the concerns outlined in our 2004 
Order. We therefore conclude that a reasonable, unaffiliated 
utility, knowing what Questar Gas knew or reasonably should 
have known, could reasonably have acted the way Questar 
Gas has acted in choosing to use the C02 Removal Plant 
since February 2005 and thereafter.60 
In contrast to this Commission finding, further amplified by seven pages 
describing the structure and content of the "transparent" decision-making process in the 
Background section of its Order, and a further three pages in the Discussion, Findings and 
Conclusion section of its Order,61 the Appellants devote but six lines of disparaging 
^Commission's January 6, 2006 Order, pp. 37-38. 
^Commission's January 6, 2006 Order, pp. 17-24 and pp. 35-38. 
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comment in a 100-page brief to that process. Reflecting more than anything else their 
absence from the process, they assert: 
These technical conferences were used by the Utility to 
instruct, not only on the issues of appliance adjustment, but 
also on considerations of "prudence" in connection with 
ongoing costs for gas processing.62 
Beyond this unsubstantiated observation, the Appellants never address the Commission's 
reasoning and findings regarding the substance and accomplishments of the technical 
conference process. 
The Appellants' misapplication of the statutory wording of Section 54-4-4(4)(a) is 
flawed for reasons other than their failure to correctly identify the Utility action or 
decision to be evaluated. A fundamental requirement that must be met in any rate making 
proceeding is a "just and reasonable rates" result.63 This requirement is, in fact, expressly 
stated in the statutory wording. In subsection 54-4-4(4)(a), just prior to the wording the 
Appellants focus on, it states: 
(a).. . the Commission shall apply the following standards in 
making its prudence determination: 
(i) ensure just and reasonable rates for the retail 
ratepayers of the public utility in this s ta te ; . . . . 
The Appellants' misapplication of the wording in sub-section (ii), that identifies 
62Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 49-50. 
63Utah Code Ann. §54-3-1 states: "All charges made, demanded or received by any 
public utility... shall be just and reasonable." 
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the proper Utility ''action," would result in unjust and unreasonable rates because it would 
either disallow rate recovery of reasonably-incurred Utility operating costs or it would 
force the Utility to pursue less sure and more costly remedies that, if allowed into rates, 
would, by definition, not result in just and reasonable rates. 
D. Neither Utah Code Section 54-4-26 nor the 1994 Planning 
Standards Proscribe Rate Recovery ofCBM Gas Processing 
Costs Incurred after February L 2005. 
The Appellants further argue in their Opening Brief that a combination of the 
wording of Section 54-4-26 and provisions in the 1994 Final Standards and Guidelines 
for Integrated Resource Planning for the Utility ("IRP Standards and Guidelines") 
proscribe any rate recovery of CBM processing costs. 
Section 54-4-26 provides, with emphasis added: 
Every public utility, when ordered by the commission shall, 
before entering into any contract for construction work or for 
the purchase of new facilities or with respect to any other 
expenditures, submit such proposed contract purchase or 
other expenditure to the commission for its approval; and, if 
the commission finds that any such proposed contract, 
purchase or other expenditure diverts, directly or indirectly, 
the funds of such public utility to any of the officers or 
stockholders or to any corporation in which they are 
interested, or is not proposed in good faith for the economic 
benefit of such public utility, the commission shall withhold 
its approval of such contract, purchase or other expenditure, 
and may order other contracts, purchases or expenditures in 
lieu thereof for the legitimate purposes and economic welfare 
of such public utility. 
42 
While this statutory wording provides the Commission discretionary authority to 
pre-approve Utility expenditures, the Appellants argue that a statement the Commission 
made in the IRP Standards and Guidelines convert the discretionary wording of the 
statute into mandatory wording that obligates the Commission to pre-approve all Utility 
affiliate contracts and expenditures. 
Before turning to the IRP Standards and Guidelines statement the Appellants rely 
upon, one might well question why the Commission would want to restrict its function in 
such a manner. The statutory wording already empowers it to require pre-approval when 
deemed necessary or appropriate. Why would it require itself to become immersed in the 
minutiae of reviewing and pre-approving all Utility affiliate transactions? Beyond the 
burden, such a requirement would put the Commission in the business of managing the 
operations of the Utility, which is a contrary to regulatory law principles.64 
Fortunately, the Commission comment the Appellants rely upon neither implies 
nor requires such a result. It states: 
Affiliate relations remain a concern of this Commission. We 
do not presume that affiliate transactions are biased and not in 
the customers' best interests. However, the Commission puts 
the Company on notice that with regard to cost recovery of 
64See, Missouri ex rel Southwestern Bell Tel Co, v. Public Serv. Comm Vz, 262 
U.S. 276, 289 (1923), that "[t]he Commission is not the financial manager of the 
corporation, and it is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the directors of 
the corporation.. . ."' See also, Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. Pub. Serv. Comm Vi, 658 
P.2d 601, 618 (Utah 1983), that "the Commission is normally forbidden from intruding 
into the management of a utility,"citingZ,ogaft City v. Public Utii Comm Vz, 296 P. 1006, 
1008 (Utah 1931). 
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[the Utility's] expenditures, we will view [the Utility's] 
customers' interests as primary. Such interests shall not be 
subordinated to those of corporate affiliates. All planning 
options that potentially benefit [the Utility's] ratepayers shall 
be investigated, whether or not they benefit subsidiaries of the 
Questar Corporation [IRP Standards and Guidelines, pp.3-4]. 
Without in any way minimizing the importance of the regulatory concern with affiliate 
transactions, this Commission comment does not state - as the Appellants assert - that 
"all affiliate transactions" or contracts will be investigated. Instead, it states "[a] 11 
planning options that potentially benefit [the Utility's] ratepayers shall be investigated, 
whether or not they benefit subsidiaries of the Questar Corporation." 
The Commission here is talking about the Utility's IRP, which is long-range 
business planning that was not implemented merely to address "the development of 
conflicts of interest among the Questar constellation of corporate entities."65 The 
Commission implemented IRP for Utah's major electric utility at the same time,66 and 
the purpose for such planning is 
to insure that the Company's present and future customers are 
provided natural gas energy services at the lowest cost 
consistent with safe and reliable service, and the fiscal 
requirements of a financially healthy utility and the long-run 
public interest. To this end, the Commission desires a 
regulatory environment that encourages [the Utility] to 
actively pursue its IRP as part of the Company's business 
65Appellants' Opening Brief, at 22. 
^Commission's December 16, 1991 Order on Draft Standards and Guidelines for 
IRP, Docket No. 91-057-09, p. 3. 
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strategy. 
In summary, there is nothing in the wording of Section 54-4-26 that requires 
Commission pre-approval of the Utility's affiliate contract for CBM gas processing 
services. Moreover, there is nothing in the Commission's IRP Standards and Guidelines 
statement that would convert the discretionary pre-approval wording of the statute into a 
mandatory pre-approval requirement.68 
III. THE PARTIES5 SETTLEMENT IS JUST AND REASONABLE AND 
SHOULD BE UPHELD UNDER UTAH LAW THAT ENCOURAGES 
SETTLEMENT OF MATTERS IN DISPUTE BEFORE THE 
COMMISSION. 
A. The Settlement Represents a Reasonable Compromise of Comflicting Party 
Positions regarding Complex Historical and Technical Issues. 
The settlement of a complex dispute usually requires a willingness by the parties to 
compromise positions in exchange for the greater benefit of a certain and sure end to the 
litigation. The more complex the legal or technical issue, generally the more costly and 
time-consuming the litigation and, generally, the more uncertain the ultimate outcome. 
The law, for these reasons, generally favors settlements. Utah law has codified 
61Id atl-2. 
68A final observation: the Utility's affiliate contract for CBM processing services 
was submitted to the Commission for approval in connection with the Utility's original 
1998 application for rate recovery of CBM gas processing expenses (Docket No. 98-057-
12). While never formally approved or dis-approved, the contract was made a part of the 
record that ultimately culminated in the Commission's August 2004 Order denying rate 
recovery of CBM gas processing expenses. A perusal of that record will reveal the 
contract was the subject of considerable review by the Commission and regulatory parties 
in those earlier proceedings. 
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that preference with regard to disputes that come before the Commission. Utah Code 
Ann. §54-7-1(1) provides: 
Informal resolution, by agreement of the parties, of matters 
before the commission is encouraged as a 
means to: 
(a) resolve disputes while minimizing the time and expense 
that is expended by: 
(i) public utilities 
(ii) the state; and 
(iii) consumers; 
(b) enhance administrative efficiency; or 
(c) Enhance the regulatory process by allowing the 
commission to concentrate on those issues that adverse 
parties cannot otherwise resolve. 
The parties were able to settle this case by allowing the Utility a mutually-
agreeable level of rate recovery for CBM processing costs without expressly delineating 
when or how alleged past Utility prudence or imprudence occurred or ceased in a 
historical time line that saw CBM grow and change from an unwanted nuisance into a 
valuable natural gas resource. This is not to say, however, that regulatory concern about 
the relationship between the Utility and its Questar affiliates was neglected or is not 
reflected in the settlement terms. Appellants' assertions that regulatory parties abandoned 
their affiliate interest concerns in settling is no more accurate than the reverse assertion 
would be that the Utility abandoned its interest in rate recovery by settling. 
The parties' settlement affirms the $29 million the Utility lost in earlier 
46 
proceedings for its failure to demonstrate its CBM processing remedy was not unduly 
influenced by affiliate interests. In addition, it assesses a further $7 million loss for that 
failure by allowing rate recovery of CBM processing costs to not begin prior to February 
1,2005. 
In summary, the settlement at issue underscores regulatory parties' affiliate 
concerns by the further loss of rate recovery that is embodied in the settlement. At the 
same time, however, the settlement accommodates the reality that CBM gas is now a 
valuable customer resource and, therefore, the Utility should, at some point, be allowed to 
recover costs it reasonably incurs in securing and making that resource available to 
ratepayers. 
Give the prior history of this dispute, there is no credible reason to think further 
litigation would achieve a more just and reasonable result for either side than what has 
been achieved in the parties' settlement. The settlement, therefore, exemplifies the 
benefits and fulfills the purposes set out in Utah Code Ann. §54-7-1(1), and for that 
reason should be affirmed by this Court. 
B. The Record in this Proceeding Supports the Commission's 
Determination that the Costs at Issue Were Prudently Incurred 
and Result in Just and Resonable Rates. 
The statutory law cited above that encourages the settlement of disputes before the 
Commission provides that the Commission may "adopt" a settlement if: 
(A) the commission finds that the settlement proposal is just 
and reasonable in result; and 
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(B) the evidence, contained in the record, supports a finding 
that the settlement proposal is just and reasonable in result.69 
In other words, the standard the Commission must use in considering the adoption of a 
settlement is no different than the standard it otherwise uses in setting rates: the result 
and/or the rate must be "just and reasonable."70 
The Commission's January 6, 2006 Order approving the settlement 
concludes that "the rates resulting from the Stipulation are just and reasonable and that 
approval of the Stipulation is in the public interest."71 This ultimate determination is 
based upon several secondary findings that have already been identified and discussed 
supra, at 24-25. The Appellants Opening Brief makes no attempt whatever to address 
these Commission factual findings or their support in the record of this proceeding. 
In summary, the Commission concluded: 
Based on the findings of fact in the foregoing sections of this 
Order, we conclude that Questar Gas' use of the C02 
Removal Plant from and after February 1, 2005 to manage the 
heat content of its gas supplies is prudent and that the partial 
recovery of costs provided in the Stipulation is reasonable and 
69Utah Code Ann. §54-7-1 (3)(d)(i) (2001). 
70Utah Code §54-3-1 provides, in part: "[a]ll charges made demanded or received 
by any public utility. . . shall be just and reasonable." Utah Code §54-4-4 provides, in 
part, that if, after hearing, the Commission finds a rate unjust, unreasonable, 
discriminatory, preferential, insufficient or otherwise in violation of any provisions of 
law, "the commission shall determine the just, reasonable, or sufficient rate. . ." 
^Commission's January 6, 2006 Order, p. 40. 
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in the public interest.72 
The Appellants have not provided any credible evidence or argument to dispute the 
Commission's conclusion. 
C. The Commission Followed the Requirements of Utah 
Code §54-7-1 in Approving the Settlement at Issue. 
The Appellants attack the Commission's approval of the settlement by asserting 
the Commission "did not consider the significant and material facts related to the case" as 
required by Utah Code Ann. §54-7-1(3)(d)(ii). Allegedly, the Commission did not 
consider the earlier factual record when considering the advisability of the settlement 
and, allegedly the only evidence it could have considered in the present record was 
"hearsay."73 This latter assertion is so general and unsubstantiated it deserves little 
response. 
Other than the documentary information developed at the six technical conferences 
which the Commission took administrative notice of, the evidence in the record is either 
witness testimony that regulatory parties and their expert consultants probed and 
evaluated through discovery, or sworn testimony of party witnesses given at the hearing 
in support of the settlement. That the Appellants were not parties to this proceeding and 
did not provide testimony does not make the evidence in the record hearsay or of no 
probative value. If that were the case, settlements before trial or hearing by disputing 
^Commission's January 6, 2006 Order, p.38. 
73Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 79. 
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parties would never have evidentiary support. Moreover, if regulatory parties and public 
utilities always had to go through the expense of a contested trial or adjudicative hearing 
before they could settle a dispute, much of the incentive and benefit to be gained from 
settling would be lost.74 
The Appellants' assertion about the lack of proper evidence in the record repeats a 
claim that Appellants Ball and Geddes made in written public witness statements filed 
with the Commission after the hearing. The Commission answered that claim, stating: 
While we take [administrative] notice [of the materials 
developed during the technical conferences], we base our 
findings and conclusions contained herein upon a thorough 
examination of the entire evidentiary record in these dockets 
and conclude that, absent any reliance on the noticed material, 
the overwhelming weight of evidence admitted in these 
proceedings, including testimony on the Stipulation, pre-filed 
testimony, and the facts asserted in the application, support 
both our conclusion that Questar Gas has acted prudently in 
evaluating and choosing among the available alternatives and 
our approval of the Stipulation.75 
The Appellants attempt to dismiss this evidence in the record with the legally 
erroneous appellation of "hearsay" falls far short of any credible refutation; and their 
further disregard of the Commission's answer to that ;no credible evidence' charge in its 
Utah Code Ann. §54-7-1(3)(a) expressly provides: 
At any time before or during an adjudicative proceeding 
before the Commission, the parties, between themselves or 
with the commission or a commissioner, may engage in 
settlement conferences and negotiations. 
Commission's January 6, 2006 Order, p. 32, footnote 18. 
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January 6, 2005 Order is not helpful either. In any case, their argument that the 
Commission did not comply with the requirements of the settlement statute is groundless. 
D, Appellants' Assertions that the Commission Violated the Requirements 
of Fair Notice and Due Process Are Untimely and Without Merit 
The Appellants assert that they were given inadequate opportunity to be heard. They do 
so despite the clear and unambiguous notice at the end of the Commission's August 2004 
Order that it would pursue in a separate docket "a long-term solution" to the CBM 
problem, despite four months of technical conferences that were properly noticed to the 
public, and despite eight months of properly-noticed Commission proceedings. 
Nowhere, however, do the Appellants respond to the Commission's determination, 
in its January 6, 2006 Order on Request to Intervene, that Appellants Ball and Geddes 
have only themselves to blame.76 While the Commission was addressing Appellants Ball 
and Geddes' petition do intervene, its conclusion applies equally well to the other 
Appellants. 
Instead of refuting the Commission's conclusion, the Appellants just add more 
unsubstantiated smoke. They argue that the Commission's order was unclear with respect 
to whether the settlement process was in the public interest in this case. They also assert: 
the Commission's docketing system is a "shambles" and its website "confusing;" the 
^Commission's January 6, 2006 Order on Request to Intervene, Docket Nos. 04-
057-04; 04-057-09; 04-057-11; 04-057-13 and 05-057-01, p. 13. 
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Commission opened too many dockets; and the Committee suddenly changed its long-
held position of opposition to any rate recovery.77 
None of these assertions have any merit. The regulatory effort to find a just and 
reasonable solution to the CBM incompatibility problem that has occurred since the 
August 2004 Commission Order has simply been too long, too extensive, too well noticed 
by the media and by Commission notices of proceedings for the Appellants' assertions to 
carry any credibility. At some point the issue becomes one of lack of diligence and 
proper care and not lack of opportunity to be heard. In this case the Appellants moved 
beyond that point months prior to the hearing on the settlement. If the process missed 
something because they were not "heard/' they have only themselves to blame. 
Amidst the smoke of Appellants' due process assertions, they also claim that the 
Committee unexpectedly 
"reversed its position, formerly refusing to give any quarter 
on the recovery of costs for processing of gas, now agreeing 
to fold the tent and withdraw from the field.78 
Appellants' jousting metaphor is apt for how they apparently view the Committee's 
statutory duty: one stakes out a position with grunts and postures and subsequently 
emerges victorious or goes down valiantly fighting. The metaphor is very inapt, however, 
where the field of battle is the court or hearing room and the weapon is evidence. 
Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 86-93. 
Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 90. See also similar claim at p. 51. 
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The Utility in this proceeding established a very complete and persuasive prima 
facie case. Appellant Ball was well aware of that fact before his departure as Committee 
Director. When the Committee retained expert consultants after his departure to analyze 
the Utility's case and provide evidentiary "weapons," those expert consultants confirmed 
the strength of the Utility's case; that changed circumstances had not only weakened the 
Committee's earlier arguments for denying rate recovery of CBM processing costs, but 
had substantially strengthened the Utility's entitlement claim to rate recovery. 
That the parties ended up in negotiations in light of the evidence already in the 
record prior to Appellant Ball's departure as Committee Director should surprise no one -
lest of all Appellants Ball and Geddes. The Committee had already authorized 
exploratory discussions with the Utility while Appellant Ball was still its Director. In 
summary, the Committee's reversal of position was neither sudden or capricious, and 
should not have been unexpected to persons acquainted with Utility regulation. 
As a final matter, the Appellants want the year-long regulatory process and 
Commission proceeding reversed and/or repeated because now, after the process has been 
completed, they consider Commission Chairman Campbell was biased and should have 
recused himself from the process.79 
As with their entire case, the Appellants are untimely with this claim as well. In 
this instance, that untimeliness is fatal. They only raise the claim now because the 
'Appellants' Opening Brief, at 94-95. 
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proceeding apparently turned out differently than they thought it would. 
To ensure due process to all parties, and to eliminate the unfair possibility of 
someone simply lying in wait to see how a proceeding ends to raise the trump card of bias 
on the part of the judge or hearing officer, the law requires that claims of bias "be raised 
as soon as practicable after a party has reasonable cause to believe that grounds for 
disqualification exist."80 In that regard, this Court has stated: 
While a motion to disqualify a judge should not be undertaken 
lightly, it must be made promptly. A party who has a 
reasonable basis for moving to disqualify a judge may not 
delay in the hope of first obtaining a favorable ruling and then 
complain only if the result is unfavorable. Not only is such a 
tactic unfair, but it may evidence a belief that the judge is not 
in fact biased. Furthermore, delay imposes unnecessary 
disruption on both the judicial system and litigants. A 
disqualification proceeding is a collateral attack on the 
substantive claim, it disrupts orderly litigation, and it 
necessarily results in significant additional costs to the parties. 
Accordingly, a party must move with dispatch once a basis for 
disqualification is discovered.81 
Even if the Appellants' claim of bias had been timely raised, they have not 
established bias on the part of Commission Chairman Campbell. The Chairman recused 
himself from the earlier proceeding because he participated in developing the Division's 
case and position before the Commission in that earlier proceeding. The Appellants have 
90
 Marcus v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 548 F.2d 1044, 
1051 (D.C. Cir. 1976), as cited in Pharaon v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, 135 F.3rd 148, 155 (U.S. App. D.C. 1998). 
%xMadsen v. Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association,, 767 P.2d 538, 542 
(Utah 1988). 
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shown no such conflict in this proceeding. If the basis of their claim is Chairman 
Campbell is experienced and has expertise in dealing with the CBM issue, that is 
considered an asset and not an unfair bias in administrative law generally and regulatory 
law specifically where the issues often revolve around extremely technical matters 
requiring expertise to appreciate and resolve. Indeed, were prior experience with the 
subject matter grounds for disqualification, utility law disputes would rarely be heard and 
decided by qualified commissioners. 
This distinction is clearly drawn in a 1998 U.S. Court of Appeals case involving 
the Federal Reserve System Board of Governors. In that case the petitioner raised 
charges of bias against the administrative law judge hearing his case, claiming the ALJ 
showed a record of ruling in favor of the Board of Governors in other proceedings as well 
as allegedly incorrect prior rulings against the petitioner. The federal appeals court 
rejected the claims, stating such evidence "falls far short of demonstrating that the ALJ 
had 'a fixed opinion-a closed mind on the merits of the case/"82 
C O N C L U S I O N 
Appellants' Appeal should be dismissed for want of standing. But, even if 
the Appellants' appearance before this Court were legally proper, their claim for relief is 
without merit. It ignores the changed circumstances that have occurred since the closing 
of the record underlying the Commission's August 2004 Order which are documented in 
S2Pharaon v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 135 F.3d 148, 
155 (U.S. App. D.C. 1998). 
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the record of this proceeding. It disregards the substantial savings regulatory parties were 
able to secure in the settlement at issue. And, Appellants' objective of returning to the 
status quo ante is unrealistic, unfair to the Utility, and harmful to the long-term best 
interests of Utility ratepayers. It would not save ratepayers money, and would spawn 
further costly legal disputes. The Committee, therefore, respectfully urges this Court to 
dismiss the Appellant's appeal or reject their claim for relief as without merit. 
Respectfully submitted Jhis 6thj&y of December,2006. 
Paul Proctor 
Assistants Attorney General 
Attorneys for The Utah Committee 
of Consumer Services 
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